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The technology of “the Internet” is not static. Although its “end-to-end” architecture has
made this “connection-less” communications system readily “extensible,” and highly
encouraging to innovation both in hardware and software applications, there are strong
pressures for engineering changes. Some of these are wanted to support novel transport
services (e.g. voice telephony, real-time video); others would address drawbacks that
appeared with opening of the Internet to public and commercial traffic – e.g., the
difficulties of blocking delivery of offensive content, suppressing malicious actions (e.g.
“denial of service” attacks), pricing bandwidth usage to reduce congestion. The expected
gains from making “improvements” in the core of the network should be weighed
against the loss of the social and economic benefits that derive from the “end-to-end”
architectural design. Even where technological “fixes” can be placed at the networks’
edges, the option remains to search for alternative, institutional mechanisms of
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Within the past decade everyday life in the economically advanced regions of the world has been
touched and in some parts substantially transformed by the advent of the Internet. The sheer scale that
the system has attained in so brief a time is breathtaking. It may be regarded as the largest artifact in
the known universe: there are now over 100 million network hosts, and some 200 million PCs are
connected on-line, and almost 30 million web-sites on the World Wide Web (Zakon, 2001). More
than 100 million people in the United States were said to be using the Internet in 2000, to
communicate with friends, family and colleagues, to access archived information in text and graphical
images, and for electronic commerce. Western Europe as a whole is likely soon to be following
Finland and Sweden’s intensive deployment of computer-mediated telecommunications, and so will
be closing the gap with the U.S. in terms of Internet penetration and the growth of business to
business commerce conducted on “the Net.”
The speed at which the numbers of host computers on the Internet have grown, like the pace at which
global connectivity has been established, and the phenomenal proliferation of diverse innovations in
applications software, are marvels that today win almost universal applause. With good reason, too,
for they distinguish this communications infrastructure’s performance from that of its historical
predecessors – the telegraph and the public switched telephone networks. This is more than merely a
further step in the expansion of communications capability. The unprecedented magnitude of the
social and economic impacts that the Internet is exerting derives equally from the concurrent
proliferation of powerful tools for exploiting the explosively expanding information resources to
which effortless global access has been made possible.
It is the openness and transparency of this network – resulting from the distinctive “end-to-end”
design of the architecture and transmission control mechanisms – that enables the Internet to tolerate
extreme diversity and heterogeneity in the technical specifications of its constituent networks and
platforms. Although the user perceives the Internet as though it were one single homogeneous
network, in actuality it is a softly integrated heterogeneous network of networks. It attracts new
network operators, service providers and users because they do not have to sacrifice proprietary
solutions and idiosyncratic preferences in order to achieve connectivity. Connecting to the Internet
does not require the using organisations to reshape the internal structure of their internal networks
(“intra-nets’) or install complicated gateways – except, of course, where security considerations
dictate the use of information "firewalls" to block unwanted access by outsiders and the unauthorised
export of data. Thus, the direct fixed costs for interconnection remain at a quite minimal level, as
there is no need for extensive reconfiguration of the organisation’s previously customised local-area
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or wide-area network (LAN and WAN) to conform to new standards, nor to replace proprietary
programs with Internet software.
An alternative, rather more lurid title for this essay might pose the question: “Will success destroy the
Internet’s end-to-end architecture?” That formulation has the virtue of suggesting the presence of a
dialectical tension in the evolution of this communications infrastructure. “Success” in this context
refers to the range of high-level features, or dimensions of system performance that are perceived by
users of the Internet, -- i.e., the ease of effecting connection and of disconnecting from the
infrastructure, its flexibility in accommodating users of heterogeneous hardware and software
applications, the simiplicity of the interface for developers of novel applications that will run at the
end-points of the network.. The source of that tension, considered in its most general aspect is simply
that many of the performance capabilities that users of this telecommunications infrastructure value as
uniquely beneficial rest upon certain technical specifications of the system that were not introduced
with a view to meeting the system performance properties and service characteristics of users of
today’s Internet.
Those same technical specifications also give rise to other, more problematic “service characteristics”
that have become manifest in the course of the surprising, spectacularly successful global deployment
of this “unmanaged” network-of-networks. Consequently, economic and political forces currently are
channeling engineering efforts towards providing remedies for the perceived drawbacks, as well as
enhancements to satisfy the technical requirements of contemplated new Internet applications. These
“adaptive modifications” cannot be construed to be part of some automatic, global process of
technological optimisation. Quite the contrary, for, what is underway essentially is a decentralized,
goal-seeking evolutionary dynamic driven by the interests of particular groups of Internet
stakeholders. This process continues to draws support from the fusion of liberal individualism and
technocracy in the philosophical-political ethos that has become quite pervasive among the
community of Internet engineering specialists, and which is predisposed to reject social and legal
modes of regulation in favour of finding purely technological mechanisms to address deficiencies in
system performance. Add to this the real obstacles to negotiating any other arrangements for the
governance of an unmanaged system that extends across numerous national jurisdictions, and it will
be evident that establishing meaningful policy guidelines for the evolving Internet will be far from
easy. Yet, in the absence of some concerted initiatives towards that end, it is not only conceivable
but increasingly probable that the piecemeal introduction of new technical mechanisms in the core of
the network will soon begin the destruction of those performance capabilities hitherto have constituted
some of the Internet’s most beneficial public goods properties.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The “technical specifications” whose prospective modification is the subject of particular concern are
those found in the layer of technology that controls and manages flows of data in the Internet, routing
information between communicating applications that are located at the end-points of the network.
The design and placement of these “bearer/network protocols” evolved from the solutions to the
antecedent engineering challenges that, during the early 1960s, attracted the attention of several
groups of digital telecommunications systems researchers. A variety of technologies were created in
that era for inter-connecting computers over packet-switched data networks, but those which came to
distinguish the Internet reflected the institutional settings, and the organisational needs of the design
groups that pioneered their implementation in the ARPANET. Similar institutional conditions
continued to influence the direction in which “inter-networking” tools used in the ARPANET were
elaborated and eventually came to be deployed on the NSFNET. The influence exerted by the
essentially stable “social parameters” of the academic research environments within which the
distinctive technical specifications of these precursor networks were developed can be displayed
clearly by tracing the historical genesis of the Internet’s principal constitutent elements: the packet-
switched data network’s end-to-end architecture, the TCP/IP protocol stack (specifying the3
transmission control mechanism and domain name system of the Internet addresses), and the features
of the widely used network services, including email, file transfer protocols (FTP), and the WWW
browser.
In the early 1990s, the operational backbone of the network constructed for the National Science
Foundation (NSF) was rather unexpectedly opened to commercial traffic, and, shortly thereafter, an
enlarged NSF backbone was transferred from government ownership to private hands. Thus, after
two decades of development under public auspices and sheltered application in scientific research
settings, where individual and organisational behaviors were regulated tightly by social norms and
institutional rules, the Internet suddenly was released into a very different, and largely unprepared
environment -- the world of telecoms users at large. An apt conceptualisation of the subsequent phase
of the Internet’s evolution therefore is that of the career-course of a wonderful, yet rather anomalous
“found object.” Far from being the instrument purposefully designed to effect a dramatic
augmentation of the global communications infrastructure, the Internet is one of those fortuitous
legacies of public programs of exploratory R&D, which different elements of modern society
subsequently have become obsessed with trying to use in a variety of ways for which it was never
intended and remains awkwardly suited. (See CSTB, 1999a, esp. Ch.7, on the role of U.S. federal
government agencies.) In this respect the description of the Internet by The Economist magazine (July
1995) as “the accidental [information] superhighway,” is fully justified by circumstances of this
technology’s early historical development, and also by the circumstances surrounding the manner in
which it was made available to the world.
The decision to open the NSFNET backbone network to commercial traffic and use by the general
public soon exposed some features of the Internet that appeared decidedly “dysfunctional” in this new
environment. Prominent among these drawbacks were the difficulties of preventing the delivery of
unwanted or offensive content; of ascertaining the identities and physical locations of either the
recipients or the initiators of messages – including those responsible for malicious actions such as
“denial of service” attacks; and of pricing usage to reduce congestion. Further, and related to the
foregoing, the platform offered by the Internet was found to be ill-adapted for use by commercial
enterprises that expected to use the familiar “fee-for-service” business model.
Contemporary efforts to address a number of these, as well as other problematic aspects of the
Internet are being channeled towards technical engineering modifications which would facilitate
monitoring and filtering of message content by public authorities, or by ISPs at access points created
within the network. The impetus to seek such “solutions” more-or-less to the exclusion of other, non-
technological approaches to amelioration, derives in some part from doubts about the efficacy of
purely national regulatory responses. Such hesitancy is quite understandable, considering the
obstacles that the global reach of the “network of networks” now posed to establishing effective
transnational governance of cyberspace.
But, the implicit policy preference for technological solutions also has been reinforced by more
explicit, and in some quarters vociferous hostility to the exploration of any legislative or legal
remedies. The historical circumstances surrounding the privatisation in the early 1990s of NSFNET,
the Internet’s immediate precursor, may be seen to have contributed to the formation of this current
climate of opinion affecting what might be called “the political economy of the Net.” The regulatory
status ab initio that the NSF’s decisions created was one in which the only governance institutions
having responsibility for Internet matters per se were exclusively concerned with the engineering
aspects of the network. Although that perhaps is not the most economically or socially significant
among the path-dependent sequelae of the terms under which the Internet’s career as a global
information infrastructure was launched, ample scope thereby was left for resistance to virtually all
save purely technological approaches to regulation. Proposed administrative or legal interventions by
public authorities continue to meet forceful resistance. But this derives less from generic laissez faire
sentiment within the business community than it does from subscribers to the political-philosophical
argument that such actions would attack the very “essence of the Internet” – construed as a global
interaction space free from governmentally imposed structures of social regulation, indeed, in more4
extreme formulations, from the interposition of all authority that would circumscribe the users’
freedom of action in cyberspace.
Developmental work on technological modifications that could alter the architecture of the Internet is
gaining further impetus currently from the prospective availability of greatly expanded (broadband)
capacity for offering new commercial services, particularly, voice-telephony and real-time video. In
addition to consuming comparatively larger quantities of bandwidth, these services are intolerant of
perceptibly long delays in transmission (“latency” in the language of specialists). Such delays,
however, are a characteristic of the Internet’s “best effort” approach to the step-wise forwarding of
data packets between the sender and the host computer on which they are reassembled for collection
by the designated receiver. Hence, would-be vendors of those and other, complementary services see
profitable opportunities in the construction of proprietary islands and archipelagos on the network
where “higher quality” telecommunications standards could be provided for their customers. The
deployment of some technologies that would provide differentiated quality of service (QOS)
constitutes a plausible evolutionary path along which the ending of “end-to-end” architecture may be
driven by private business initiatives, rather than by technological modifications introduced to enable
governmental control functions.
It is in just this connection that another among the numerous unexpected consequences of the
Internet’s deployment had assumed considerable potential importance for policy-setting: the opening
of interconnection to public telecommunications domains (cellular radio, satellite and cable) into
which the providers of commercial services can migrate. By doing so, some providers of Internet
services (ISPs) may be able to escape from existing legal and administrative restraints that, for
historical reasons, had been imposed upon businesses based upon other communication modalities.
The implications of this facilitation of “regulatory bypass” are illustrated by the current asymmetric
regulatory treatment of the telephone industry and the cable broadcast industry in the US. Network
operators in the long-regulated telephone who offer broadband access to the Internet have been
required, largely for reasons of competition policy goals, to provide their customers with open and
non-discriminatory access to other broadband ISPs. Cable companies, although performing the same
functions, find themselves under no corresponding regulatory constraints. As a result, informed
observers recently have expressed alarm that the existing regime of regulation (and non-regulation),
by permitting the cable companies to bundle broadband access with selected application services
offerings, is creating particularly powerful private economic incentives for what might be called the
“business balkanising” of the Internet (see, e.g., Lemley and Lessig, 2000).
There is no a priori reason to suppose that the most efficient path to “enhanced” Internet performance
is one that relies solely upon “fixes” and enhancements that can be implemented in computer
hardware and software. Introducing engineering solutions into the core of the network would entail a
sacrifice of the future benefits provided by the “end-to-end” architecture, and thus may not be justified
by the social value of the “performance improvements” thereby achieved. Where it is not feasible to
place technological solutions at the edges of the network, there is at very least a potentially strong
case for directing greater resources towards developing effective political and legal institutions to
regulate the behaviours of Internet users. Rather than being viewed as substitutes, technological and
social mechanisms of governing cyberspace may offer complementary solutions that should be
explored in a coordinated, and necessarily multi-disciplinary fashion. When political and legal devices
appear likely to prove unworkable, or excessively costly to maintain, and where the technological
implementation of new functions would require sacrificing the Internet’s “end-to-end” engineering,
the rational policy course is then to acknowledge the existence of a conflict between alternative
desiderata in the Internet’s capabilities. The social value of the functionality that would be added to
the performance of the global information infrastructure in that case should be weighed carefully
against the benefits that would be lost with the ending of “end-to-end”.
In the remainder of this essay some documentation is supplied for the main empirical propositions on
which foregoing argument rests, and its principal policy contentions are unpacked for closer
examination. Section III briefly recalls some history of the Internet, focusing upon the non-5
commercial, homogeneous social contexts of invention and implementation within which the key
enabling technologies were created and incorporated into the designs of the major inter-networks
supporting communications among scientific research communities. The view of the Internet as
evolving subsequently from its initial status as a marvellous but in some ways very awkward “found
object”, receives further elaboration from an examination of the circumstances in which the NSFNET
backbone network was opened to commercial traffic at the end of the 1980s, and soon thereafter, was
transferred to private ownership. This highlights some of the enduring and quite predictable
consequences that followed from the unregulated condition in which the backbone of the Internet was
privatised: the ensuing oligopolistic structure of the backbone industry, and the conduct of its
dominant firms affecting the provision of capacity at key network access points (NAPs).
Section IV reviews the several emergent features of the Internet’s performance as a general-purpose
communications infrastructure that presently are perceived to be socially and economically
problematic, indeed, in some instances seriously “dysfunctional.” The discussion indicates how such
problems have emerged to become focal points for proposed remedial technological modifications
that would be implemented in the core of the network. An effort then is made, in Section V, to
provide an expanded framework in which to consider the policy issues raised, on one side, by calls for
improved mechanisms of governing behaviour on the Internet, and, on the other side, by the quest for
new private profit opportunities. The benefits of the solutions proffered in response to these dual
challenges must be assessed against the costs of the likely irreversible damage which could be done to
the Internet’s “end-to-end” architecture by a laissez faire stance that liberally accepted all
technological solutions – so long as they could be shown to “work.” Two generic technical questions
are identified as being important in this connection. The first is whether the perceived need for a
technical “fix” reflects a condition that otherwise would persist on the Internet, or whether the
problem is likely to be transient in nature. The second is whether the proposed technological solution
itself is likely to remain efficacious over the longer run, instead of providing only a temporary
palliative.
The paper concludes in Section VI, by setting forth a few broad considerations that ought to guide
policy approaches to controlling the character of technical enhancements and regulating human
behaviours on the Internet, through the design of institutional mechanisms of governance as well as
technological engineering solutions. This brief discussion underscores the need to take account of the
present dynamism of the Internet’s enabling technologies, and also of the limitations imposed by the
distinctive architecture that was inherited from its historical precursors. It suggests, further, that for
the field of “Internet economics” to mature into an area of disciplinary specialisation that has more
immediate policy relevance, economists will need to develop a greater appreciation of both of those
realities, as well as of the historically contingent processes of technological and institutional co-
evolution.
III. THE DEVELOPMENTAL CONTEXT OF THE ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
A significant element of historical irony is present in the circumstances that gave rise to the key
component technologies of “the network of networks.” We perceive the Internet today as affording
global connectivity and access to a wealth of diverse information resources for a variegated multitude
of organisations and individuals, an assembly of actors motivated by a wide variety of interests that
are aligned in some respects, while conflicting in others, and guided by value systems that coincide on
some issues but diverge strongly on others. It appears only too evident that human interactions in such
a sphere would be bound to create the myriad problems of governance that arise in any reasonably
complex social setting. Further complicating matters, the parties brought into contact with one another
“on the Net” are not embedded within a unified social order, but, instead, are drawn from a culturally
and politically heterogeneous collection of societies. Yet, the architecture of the network and the
specifications of its components and service functions were not designed with anything resembling
the present area of applications in mind. As may be seen from even the briefest sketch of the6
developmental context of the Internet’s enabling technologies – from the pre-ARPANET origins of
packet-switching in the mid-1960’s, the design of the TCP and IP protocols for host-to-host
communications, and through the succession of widely used “network service” technologies from E-
mail and FTP, to the WWW browser that CERN released for public use in 1991 – the most powerful
persistent considerations shaping the developmental process were the communications needs of an
entirely different, and far more homogenous institutional and social environment. This was the
distinctive epistemic culture of the successive publicly funded scientific research groups that were
themselves responsible for the invention and implementation of the Internet’s precursor networks. In
that sense, it might be said that the creation of the Internet was a reflexive technological achievement.
Although widely distributed geographically, and situated in a variety of academic and quasi-academic
institutions, the technologists who took the lead in “casting the Net” and “weaving the Web” were
very much alike in regard to the general ethos of cooperation and the social norms characteristic of
their respective scientific and engineering work cultures. As will be seen, the membership of those
groups consisted largely of scientists and engineers engaged in cooperative research undertakings, for
which they had been recruited by reference to criteria of technical competence (and national security
considerations, in some early instances). Beyond this considerable measure of social and professional
homogeneity, the access of the members of these work-groups to the novel communication network
they were fashioning initially was quite constrained; and the behaviour of individual users was subject
to supervision and non-technological regulation by the respective university- and public institute-
based organisations within which they were employed.
Quite understandably, then, the researchers who invented and improved what were to become the
distinctive technical features of the Internet made few if any engineering provisions to cope with
issues of content, privacy, security, identity, and so forth. Nor was attention given to devising means
of protecting the functionality of the network from being degraded by attacks that could originate in
the behaviours of its users, rather than from external agencies. This was so primarily because those
issues were not problematic for the original designers, their institutions, or their sponsors.
Numerous historical narratives have detailed the contributions made by particular individuals and
agencies to the technical development of the Internet. However, in order to see how the design choices
of these pioneers has been shaped by the institutions of which they were part it is helpful to identify
four distinct phases in the evolution of the Internet.
†
(i) Data Communications and the Dawn of Packet Switching
The opening phase took place during the 1960’s, when individual researchers based at different
universities and research institutions in the U.S. and Britain were concurrently developing the
underlying means to enable data communications between computers, including queuing theory,
packet-switching and routing. A guiding conceptual framework, indeed, the first recorded description
of the social interactions that could be enabled by computer networking, was set out in a series of
memos written in 1962 by J. C. R. Licklider, a psychologist at MIT, who soon thereafter became the
first director the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) at the U.S. Defense Department’s
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). Licklider and Clark’s (1962) “Galactic Network”
concept envisaged a globally interconnected set of computers through which humans could quickly
access data and programmes from any site. This phase was brought to a close in December 1968,
when ARPA issued a contract to the firms of Bolt, Beranek and Newman (BBN) of Cambridge,
Mass., to build a packet-switched network along the lines of the initial design presented in 1967 by
Lawrence Roberts, an IPTO program manager recruited from MIT.
† The material on which the following paragraphs draw includes recent retrospective accounts provided by
leading participants (Cerf 1997; CSTB, 1999a: Ch.7; Leiner et al., 2000, Berners-Lee, 1999), as well as
secondary sources, including Abbate, 1999; Hafner and Lyon, 1996, Hauben and Hauben (1997); Rogers, 1998;
Salus, 1995; Zakon, 2001).7
Most of the early research on networking that was encouraged by Licklider, and the subsequent
directors of IPTO who he influenced, had focused on packet-switching. A paper written by Leonard
Kleinrock (1961) , also at MIT, first proposed this technique, and the appearance of Kleinrock’s
(1964) book on the subject attracted still greater attention, because it offered an efficient means of
handling the “bursty” transmissions that computers would generate. Unlike voice conversations which
can be characterised statistically, computers communications are sufficiently unpredictable that were
they to be carried through the connections that served voice telephony, it would become necessary to
provide wide margins of extra (and only irregularly used) capacity in the lines. Given the high fixed
costs of computers at the time, networking was an economically attractive prospect – as was time-
sharing of mainframe capaciity – so long as it permitted attaining high utilization rate on this
equipment without requiring the addition of expensive margins of excess transmission capacity.
Packet-switching, developed largely independently by IPTO, by Donald Davies and Roger
Scantlebury at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in Middlesex, England and by Paul Baran
(1964) and his co-workers at the RAND Corporation, was the means of achieving this. The
breakthrough entailed a means of using the existing capacity of the PSTN infrastructure more
intensively, by dividing streams of binary data (messages) into small units contained in envelop-like
“datagrams,” each of which carried the address of the final destination (host computer) to which it
would be routed through the network independently of the others, until they arrived for re-assembly at
their common destination. The researchers at NPL coined the term “packet” in referring to these small
units of addressed data. Specialised computers -- Interface Message Processors, or IMPs, as these
were dubbed at the time – handled the tasks of receiving and forwarding packets, both keeping track
of the traffic and varying the routes taken by the packets to avoid congested nodes and failed links,
functions performed today by “routers” on the Internet. When this design was first introduced, its
critical feature was seen in freeing the scarce data processing resources of the mainframe “host”
computers from network operation tasks. But the resulting separation of the (IMP-) computer
mediator communications network from the data processing “intelligence” represented by the hosts at
its edges was a radical, defining step in the genesis of the end-to-end architecture of the modeern
Internet.
(ii) The Age of the ARPANET: New Network Services, the Genesis of TCP/IP
The second phase of development began in 1969 with the installation of the four initial nodes of the
ARPANET. That this network was to serve as a research tool for host-to-host communications in
support of the work of the research organisation that built it is apparent from nature of the projects at
those nodes: (1) Leonard Kleinrock’s research group at UCLA, (2) the Stanford Research Institute
project, in Menlo Park CA, where Doug Englebart’s On Line System (NLS) was used as the host, (3)
Ivan Sutherland’s pioneering computer graphics group at the University of Utah, and (4) a U.C. Santa
Barbara project that was developing an interactive system for mathematical education (see CBST,
1999: pp. 172-173, 228-232). At first, the ARPANET was used primarily as a facility for
experimentation with packet-switching, rather than a communications service for the researchers
situated at its nodes. This necessarily was the case at the outset because the first protocols for host-to-
host communications – the Network Control Protocol (NCP) – were not completed by the Network
Working Group (NWG) led by Steven Crocker until the end of 1970.
Once the ARPANET sites had completed implementation of NCP during 1971-72, however, network
users began developing service-applications. The Telnet protocol was introduced to allow a user on
one machine to log onto another, at a remote site, thereby sharing ARPA’s costly computing
equipment; the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) also came early, in 1971, to allow a user on one system
to connect to another in order to send or retrieve particular files. But the service that turned out to be
the most the popular, the “killer app” for the ARPANET community, was the e-mail system
(READMAIL) introduced in 1972 by Ray Tomlinson, who modified an electronic communications
facility which he had previously developed (for users of BBN’s time-sharing system, Tennex) so that
it would run on the new network.8
Although it breaks the chronological ordering of this narrative, it is nonetheless useful at this point to
jump ahead to the circumstances that gave rise to the creation of the World Wide Web (WWW)
browser, the new inter-networking service technology developed during at the end of the 1980’s by
Tim Berners-Lee, and which became the “killer application” whose popularity was a major factor
driving the growth of the Internet from the early 1990’s onward. The purpose in doing so is not
simply to notice the general parallel with the previous case of e-mail on the ARPANET, but to
underscore the aspect of similarity concerning the non-commercial, research supporting motivation in
the invention of the WWW by Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau at CERN, the high-energy
particle physics facility in Geneva, Switerland (see Berners-Lee 1999, CSTB 1999a, Hameri and
Norberg 1998, Naughton 1998). The idea of the Web itself is simple enough: provide a uniform
format for archiving documents stored on server computers, and assign a unique name to each
document so that it can be located and retrieved by a browser programme. Because the unique names
(termed universal resource locators, or URLs) would include the domain name system (DNS) name of
the host on which the documents were stored, they were long and the URLs could more conveniently
be represented as briefer hypertext links in other documents – thereby making use of the hypertext
system that had been invented by Douglas Englebart back in 1967 (in a project that, incidentally, was
drawing support from ARPA).
There was an essentially parochial impetus behind Berners-Lee and Cailliau’s development of a
document format for this purpose -- the variant of the Standard Generalized Markeup Language in use
in the publishing industry since the 1950s, which they called the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
and released as a new Internet protocol in July, 1992. CERN mobilises the work of thousands of
physicists from many countries, who are organised in teams that cooperate to build and operate large
experimental facilities; coordination of this work demanded reliable and rapid access to the
documentation of all the parts of the complex apparatus that specialised groups were working on. This
was the internal need that persuaded CERN to underwrite Berners-Lee to work on his proposal in the
late 1980s. But, like e-mail, some two decades earlier, the resulting browser technology turned out to
have a considerably wider field of application.
Coming back now to the 1970’s, one must emphasize that of ultimately far greater significance than
the introduction of novel “network services, ” this period of intentensive research on the ARPANET
saw the emergence of the technical design principles and specifications for a “connection-less”
telecommunications infrastructure. These remain the fundamental features that distinguish the Internet
from other, “connection-oriented” systems such as the public switched telephone networks (PSTNs).
The key underlying technical idea was “open architecture networking,” which Robert Kahn
introduced in 1972, shortly after coming to ARPA from BBN. This approach called for the designing
of a encompassing, meta-level “inter-networking” architecture which, instead of tightly dictating the
specifications of individual network technologies and the interfaces between them, would leave such
features free to be set so as to meet the particular performance requirements of their respective
providers, while enabling them to function in conjunction with other, similarly unconstrained
networks (see Leiner et al., 2001).
Kahn started with the task of linking a packet radio network with the wired ARPANET by means of a
transport protocol that would be able to operate no matter how unreliable were the underlying links –
due to conditions such as radio interference, due to natural terrain or to jamming, and which therefore
could not be embedded in the infrastructure of the transport layer itself (CSTB, 1997: p. 20; Leiner, et
al., 2001). ARPA was engaged at this time in research on other applications of packet switched
communications, including both terrestrial packet radio, and packet satellite transmission. Its’ group
working in Hawaii (Aloha project) was particularly interested in being able to interconnect computers
by radio, rather than having to set up costly hardware on the islands. In 1973, working with Vinton
Cerf (then at Stanford University), Kahn moved on from this particular problem to address the generic
problem. The solution that emerged was the Transmission Control Protocol (TPC), which assigned to
the sending nodes the responsibility for regulating the flow of packets in response to indications of
network congestion based upon the cumulative acknowledgments from (adjacent) receiving nodes. It
also specified an addressing mechanism that could accommodate as many as 4 billion hosts. Unlike9
the ARPANET’s NCP which enabled communication between hosts on a single network, the TCP
specifications (separated into TCP and IP protocols in 1978) were designed to interconnect multiple
networks, and so allow communication between computers on a variety of different networks (CSTB,
1999aa: p. 174.)
From the narrow technological angle the ARPANET (and its successors) may be regarded simply as
one among a number of technical solutions to the problem of interconnecting host computers of
different types, and, more importantly, also networks based on different switching and transmission
technologies. In the late 1960s and early 1970s alternative technical solutions were being explored or
were available already to interconnect the technically diverse assortment of data networks that had
sprung up in the USA, including the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) Universal Packet from
Xerox, the Unix-to-Unix copy protocol (UUCP) originally developed in the Bell Labs of AT&T,
which was licensed out practically for free, and the standards proposed by the ambitious OSI-project
that was being promoted in Europe. (Hafner and Lyon 1996; Salus 1995; David and Werle 2001, for
further discussion.) Consequently, at the beginning of the 1980s it was hardly a foregone conclusion
that the open-architecture design and TCP/IP would emerge as the dominant technologies for inter-
networking computers. Indeed, it was not until January 1 of 1983 that the TCP/IP protocol stack --
whose details had been published almost a decade earlier by Cerf and Kahn (1974) – actually replaced
the original (NCP) control protocols on the ARPANET. By the early 1980s the ARPANET was
supporting a number of operational defense organizations as well as R&D organisations, and the
mandated transition to TCP/IP provided an opportunity for the DoD to split off a MILNET that would
support operational requirements, leaving ARPANET supporting only the needs of the R&D
activities.
(iii) NSF and the Rise of Academic Networking in the 1980’s
During the 1980s new, higher capacity cooperative networks were more widely deployed to support
university based research, a development that began in 1981 with BITNET, and CSNET; the latter
(Computer Science Network) drew funding support from the NSF for the purpose of connecting those
computer science departments that had no access to the ARPANET and consequently lacked not only
sophisticated facilities for collaborative experimentation, but email communication. At its peak,
CSNET had approximately 200 participating sites and international connections to fifteen countries.
In 1987 it was merged with BITNET to form the voluntary, self supporting non-profit Corporation for
Research and Educational Networking (CREN); with the development of the NSFNET the needs that
had given rise to CSNET no longer existed and by 1991 the service had been discontinued
Eventually, still more geographically extensive regional computer networks were linked in the U.S.
and served a widening circle of scientific disciplines, requiring increasing technical and organisational
attention to the provision of capacity and interoperability. Overseas, the European Academic Research
Network (EARN) was established in 1983, and in the following year Britain launched the Joint
Academic Network (JANET) program – the first network whose announced purpose was to provided
interconnecting computing facilities for the entirety of the country’s university research community,
without regard to discipline. The National Science Foundation followed suit with the NSFNET
program in 1985.
The NSF’s immediate purpose in launching the NSFNET was to connect its five super-computing
centers (and the National Center for Atmospheric Research) with university computers via what was
at the time a “high-speed” (56kbps !) network, and this had been accomplished by 1986. But once it
had been implemented as a general-purpose network, NSFNET began to serve as the “backbone” or
upper tier of a hierarchical network of networks. Its ability to interconnect readily with sub-networks
in this manner resulted from a critical event in 1985: following a proposal 1985 made by Dennis
Jennings, who recently had come from Trinity College, Dublin, to lead this initiative at NSF, a crucial
decision was taken to base the NSFNET system on the TCP/IP data communications protocol.
This was a controversial and hotly contested issue at the time (see Rogers 1998), since the main users
of the super-computers were physicists and chemists who were accustomed to working with10
DECNET, and protocols derived from other proprietary mainframe networks, and so were dubious
about the wisdom of Jennings’ proposal especially as there was no actual experience with super-
computers using TCP/IP. On the opposite side were arrayed other, regional and local research and
education networks whose participants were drawn from computer science groups that had gained
experience with TCP/IP on ARPANET. Still others were pressing NSF for expanded access to data
communications of the sort that TCP/IP would permit – by setting up connections to the NSFNET for
local campus LANs, private data networks maintained by corporations engaged in research on
computer science and networking, and regional WANs linking departments and laboratories at
different universities. Networks of that kind evolved in the second half of the 1980s. Many of them
were co-sponsored by private business organizations and this contributed to increasing their technical
heterogeneity, as researchers in those settings were using LAN-technologies (such as Ethernet), X.25,
SNA, DECNET and other proprietary solutions. Thus, BARRNET, the Bay Area Regional Research
Network, included local research-oriented corporate members from IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Xerox
PARC, as well as Stanford, the University of California at Berkeley, and the Lawrence Livermore
Lab, with the non-university members being restricted from using these networks for commercial
purposes other than research (see Headley 1995).
All these local and regional networks were required to adopt TCP/IP in order to become connected to
the NSFNET backbone, and this had a significant impact in diffusing acceptance of the TCP/IP
protocol stack more widely as the de facto national standard for inter-networking. Of course, at least
three positive features of TCP/IP that entered into the NSF decision also were more generally
conducive to its rapid emergence as a de facto standard. These were: (a) its use on the ARPANET,
where it completely replaced NCP at the beginning of 1983, had thoroughly demonstrated the ease
with which it could be used to interconnect heterogeneous networks, (b) the fact that, being a non-
proprietary standard, it was made available through electronic distribution free of charge, and (c)
TCP/IP already was part of the tightly integrated networking capabilities that were included in the
U.C. Berkeley-produced version of the UNIX operating system (BDS). The latter, which ran on both
DEC’s VAX line of inexpensive (mini-) computers popular with scientists, and the new SUN personal
workstations (from the fledgling SUN Microsystems, Inc.), at that time was gaining exposure and
popularity among computer scientists.
Thus, at the end of the 1980s the TCP/IP supporters were growing in number and gaining acceptance
from their previously sceptical peers in the private computer and networking industries, as well as
from IT specialists in the mission- oriented public research labs of the Department of Energy and
NASA. By the early 1990’s, the momentum acquired by the campaign for TCP/IP within the
technically sophisticated networking community had imparted to the nascent Internet some of its
appeal as a “grass roots” movement that had been able to triumph in the face of resistance, and even
initial hostility on the part of those steeped in the engineering orthodoxy of the PTT’s
telecommunications establishment. There is a connection worth noticing here, between the pioneers’
shared experience of successful technological insurgency, and the reinforcement of certain
technocratic traditions and attitudes that continue to colour policy discussions concerning the
governance of the “unmanaged” global (inter-) network to which the success of TCP/IP gave rise.
What stands out in this, indeed throughout the first three phases of the development of inter-
networking that have been reviewed, is the interplay between the institutional environment and the
behaviour of the new technology’s user-innovators. Early on, computer scientists formed particular
communities, initially around specific time-shared computers, and later around programming
languages, operating systems and computer networks (Norberg and O’Neill 1996). However, by the
late 1970s and early 1980s there had emerged a broader sense of participating in a community that
was pioneering revolutionary changes in information processing freed from constraining network
architectures. This manifested itself in a more unified spirit of collaboration, informality, and even a
sense of social responsibility reflected by norms and rules concerning the use of networks, that was
especially striking to observers from other cultures (Leib and Werle 1998).11
Moreover, this particular form of voluntary, self-governance mechanism (complementing the
minimalist approach to specifying technological mechanisms) for regulating the actions the members
of inter-networking communities, soon appeared among participants in the regional networks that
were forming at the margins of the universities, and even beyond. The creation of many small
community networks in U.S. during the early 1980s was propelled by a growing interest in
conferencing systems and discussions via mailing lists. Most notable was the UUCP based USENET,
a system of newsgroups (bulletin boards) that originally was designed as a forum for UNIX users to
discuss their problems and assist one another other with the use of that portable operating system.
Very soon USENET grew into a platform for a broad variety of “newsgroups” created by the users,
including anti-authoritarian student groups and hacker communities (Hauben and Hauben 1997).
USENET relied on self-organization and also on self-restraint. It was in the USENET context that
many rules and norms evolved into what came to be known as the “Netiquette,” an informal code of
conduct proposed for Internet users. The Netiquette included basic maxims such as "never disturb the
flow of information," and "every user has the right to say anything and to ignore anything" – which
were viewed as natural extensions of fundamental values of American society, such as freedom of
speech and free flow of information. They served at least for a time to extend to a widening circle of
inter-networking users a more self-conscious version of the cooperative ethos implicitly subscribed to
by the scientific and engineering workgroups who had pioneered in the early development and
application of the technology.
Thus, the essential trade-off that was accepted in following the open-architecture’s end-to-end design
path was to forego assuring full interoperability of applications through engineered standardisation of
equipment and network specifications, in order to secure ubiquitous interconnection and freedom of
the users to experiment with a variety of applications technologies (both hardware and software). One
manifestation of the success of the latter strategy was the emergence of a growing cadre of “inter-
networking” engineers that took de facto responsibility for achieving and maintaining necessary
minimal levels of interoperability through the promulgation of peer-negotiated compatibility
standards for the Internet. Starting with the practices of the Network Working Group (NWG) that was
loosely organised in 1968 under the leadership of Steve Crocker at UCLA to develop host protocols
for the ARPANET, the network distribution of “requests for comments” (RFCs) was initiated in 1969
to facilitate quick dissemination and discussion of ideas and technical specifications by members of
what, at that time, was still a small – although geographically dispersed – community of researchers
(Abbate 1999: pp. 73-74).
Proposals that seemed interesting were likely to be taken up and tested by someone, and
implementations that were found useful soon were copied to similar systems on the network.
Everyone who had access to the ARPANET could participate in this process, for although the
networks specifications were regarded as military standards (“milspec”), they were not “classified”
and therefore remained open and available free of charge. Eventually, as the File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) came into use, the RFCs were prepared as on-line files that could by accessed via FTP; today
they are readily accessible at various sites on the Web, but the RFC have retained their original
formatting, with the same courier font and plain style in which the ARPANET protocol was defined
back in 1969.
These were the roots of what has grown into the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the
voluntary organisation that was formed in 1986 and is now structured in 100 working groups covering
eight to ten functional areas. Only since 1992 has the term “standard” officially been used to describe
technical specifications promulgated as having completed the full process of acceptance for the
Internet (RFC 1311): two independent implementations must have been shown to work, and to be
interoperable. The informal IETF credo, coined by David Clark of MIT conveys the ethos of the
Internet’s pioneers: “We reject kings, presidents and voting. We believe in rough consensus and
running code.” (See David and Werle, 2000: p. 19.)12
A bedrock of technocratic faith underlies this colourful formulation. For every problem there must be
an engineering solution, and optimal solutions to engineering problems will be self-evident to all who
are qualified by competence to judge; something cannot be “right” if its adoption has to be authorised
by taking a formal vote. That philosophy, and the further legitimation of the rejections of the
apparatus of national regulation and international governance that had evolved with the infrastructures
of telegraphy and telephony, was given further impetus in the early 1990s by the circumstances under
which the NSFNET backbone was opened to commercial traffic and its owner was transferred to the
private sector.
(iv) The Privatising of NSFNET and the Rise of the Internet in the 1990’s
Although inter-networking originally had been driven by the possibilities of enabling high-speed
traffic in massive volumes of digital scientific data and the shared utilisation of the costly mainframe
computing capacity needed to process it, recognition of the technology’s potential to improve
personal communications and collaborative activities quickly began to spread; a widening array of
academic and industrial researchers were making use of these networks and the demand for greater
capacity in the NSFNET backbone of the system was mounting. The enthusiastic reception of the
NSF’s promotional efforts saw the number of hosts on the network increased from 213 in August
1981 to 159,000 in October 1989 (see Zakon 2001:statistical annex). Work on ungrading the
backbone of the NSFNET to the “T-1 line” level (1.5 Mbps) had been started in 1987 and was
completed in July of 1988, and preparations were being made for a further expansion of capicity
(accomplished in 1991 when the NSFNET became a T-3 (45 Mbps) backbone (see, CBST, 1994:
Appendix A, pp. 237ff. for further details of federal networking programmes in this era).
These and other responsibilities arising from its support of high-speed computer networking were
placing increasingly onerous financial and administrative burdens upon the NSF. As a result, under
the leadership of Stephen Wolff, the NSF delegated the operation of NSFNET to Advanced Network
Services (ANS), a joint venture of IBM, MCI and Merit (see Kesan and Shah, 2001), and from 1989
onwards the Foundation was actively promoting the participation of commercial users in regional
networks who could share the fixed costs of expanding capacity, and so might make the infrastracture
self-sustaining – at least with regard to the NSF budget. The ensuing problems that arose about the
access structure and the arrangements between ANS and commercial ISPs that were taking over
responsibilities for operating the network, set the stage for the fourth phase of development.
This, the final phase of NSF’s stewardship brought, in remarkably quick succession: (i) a partial
easing in 1988-90 of the Authorized Use Policy (AUP) -- which hitherto had proscribed all
commercial non-research uses of the network; (ii) an accelerated movement toward privatising the
network’s core, commencing in 1991 with the addition by ANS of a privately owned backbone; (iii)
the creation, and the award in 1994 of private ownership of the new Network Access Points (NAPs)
that were needed to connect together the federal networks, commercial backbone networks, and a
Very High Speed Backbone Service (vBNS) that was being built as a replacement for NSFNET’s
research and educational supporting functions; (iv) the migration of regional networks to commercial
backbone service providers and the retirement of the NSFNET at the end of April 1995; (v) the
withdrawal, announced by NSF in August 1996, of further sponsorship of the four “public NAPs” –
which were thereafter to be operated entirely by the private sector – thereby completing the
privatising of the Internet (see CSBT, 1999a:pp. 177-179; Kesan and Shah, 2000:pp. 18-26).
Although these matters rarely are discussed in the many accounts of the history of the Internet’s
development, there are many instructive lessons to be drawn from a detailed examination of the way
in which the transition to the private sector control of this communications infrastructure was carried
out (see Kesan and Shah (2001) for an extensive treatment). A point that stands out perhaps most
starkly in the present connection is that the whole process was intiated and carried through with
unusual rapidity and with little if any antecedent history of deliberation about the regulatory
framework, and the implications that the terms of the Internet’s privatising would have for the
competitive structure of the new network services industry that was being launched.13
Thus, even though there were plans as early as 1987 that envisaged a future transition of NSFNET to
the private sector, little advance work was done in the following four years, so that the organisational
aspects of the Internet’s emergence may legitimately be cited as another dimension of the story
contributing to the “accidental” character of the advent of “the information super-highway.” Yet, in
this regard, the limited planning of the process appears to have resulting in some outcomes that are
decidedly troubling. Kesan and Shah (2001) make a persuasive case that NSF erred initially in
entering into a cooperative agreement with ANS that did not envisage the commercial use of
NSFNET, and so there were no clear guidelines for NSF when the joint venture that that was acting as
the government’s sole contractor began to ask for and later sell access to the (publicly funded)
NSFNET. NSF’s actions in this regard left ANS initially in a position to block the entry of
competitors into the provision of backbone services. But, of more lasting consequence, the multiple
backbone system – which was intended to create competitive conditions – was designed in a way that
contributed to the present highly concentrated structure that has emerged in that market. Furthermore,
in designing the NAPs, and in transferring operational responsibility and eventual support to the
private sector, the NSF did not put in place performance requirements. The market power of the large
ISPs, and the fact that the provision of increased capacity at the public NAPs has been neglected, so
that they have become areas for congestion on the Internet, represent specific unhappy legacies of the
privatisation process that will bear some further discussion below.
IV. MOUNTING PRESSURES FOR AN ENDING OF “END-to-END”
If the Internet is to be seen as a valuable, albeit challenging technological gift bestowed upon the
private sector, this does not warrant regarding it as a static artefact. Quite the contrary, this component
of the global information infrastructure continues to undergo technical modifications and the course of
this seemingly incremental evolution may well bring about rather radical changes in high-level service
performance characteristic of the system.
A number of forces may be seen to have been driving the Internet’s technological transformation, but
among these perhaps the currently most potent arise from the combination of current perceptions of
the “short-comings”and undesireable performance features associated with some widely used
applications, and a recognition that new capabilities would have to be added to the Net to meet the
technical requirements of a number novel applications that are now contemplated. The critical
questions of concern here are whether it is essential to address all of these problems purely through
technnological mechanisms, and, where new service requirements necessitate technical “fixes,”
whether it is possible to implement them in ways that would not entail departures from the end-to-end
principles of architectural design.
During the Internet’s first two decades the dominant approach among those designing applications
was to work within the very tolerant parameters set by the general data transport service provided by
the routers in the core of the network. Because the Net was a rapidly expanding facility that could be
used by a very wide range of applications, regardless of their individual differences, there was little
interest on the part of commercial interests to seek to develop new applications that would, in effect,
challenge the existing architectural design principles rather than exploiting them. But, that design
regime now has come under increasing pressure from the accumulation of new performance
requirements for network services, and the emergence of demands for applications whose features
might be more conveniently provide by implementing them “in” the network’s core.
Three classes of challenges to the preservation of the Internet’s end-to-end architecture have usefully
been identified by Clark and Blumenthal (2000): (1) non-cooperative and “untrustworthy” behaviours
at the Net’s end-points, (2) applications requiring higher levels of service quality in data transport
than “best effort” forwarding, and (3) the emergence of large ISPs pursuing new competitive
strategies. The following paragraphs indicate the nature of the issues that have come to the fore in
these several areas.14
(i )Technical responses to non-cooperative behaviours at the end-points
It now is generally acknowledged that the presumption of reliable cooperation among the agents at the
end-points, which underlay the approach implemented by the builders of the ARPANET, is
completely at variance with the facts of today’s Internet. Manifestations of deviations from norms of
“trustworthy” behaviour at the end-points of the Net range from the comparatively benign, albeit
annoying imposition of email “spam” upon receipients, to unsolicted receipt to messages carrying
offensive content, to “denial of service” attacks directed against particular web-servers, and attacks
on the functioning of the network as a whole. (For a comprehensive review of the issues involving
“trust in cyberspace,” see CSTB 1999b.) A variety of technical solutions have been introduced to
address these problems. Some confine the remedial mechanism to the applications that run at the
endpoints, such as email program filters that automatically delete messages from unrecognized
sources, or scan the content for pre-specified “sensitive” text and alert the reader before the message
is opened. Other mechanisms, however, are interposed between the sender and the receiver by third
parties, and these have the effect of balkanising the Internet by creating enclaves over which
discretionary control of information flows can be exercised.
“Balkanisation” is a term that often carried strong pejorative connotations, but, in the context of
discussing the architecture of a communications network it may be used in a more neutral way. What
usually will determine the value-overtones assigned to the term is the nature of the purposes that are
served, and the nature of the purposes that are sacrificed by interposing non-transparent mechanism
between users situated on the network’s end-points. Another, related taxonomic distinction focuses
upon whether the objectives are, or aren’t agreed upon by the affected users. On the one hand, the
intervening agency may have a controlling role that users are aware of, and to which they assent:
business firms or a non-profit organizations, such as universities and private foundations that install
“firewalls” are in a position to use these devices to thwart the unauthorized export of particular data
files, as well as to block access to specific classes of sites -- whether for the purposes of denying users
within the “protected” sphere access to websites identified as providing pornographic material,
“hate” publications, or, simply, to time-diverting interactive games, and inessential services that tax
the capacity of the organisations servers (as was the experience of some American universities in the
Napster episode). In the same way, “filters” are being installed by end-use organisaations and also by
ISPs, as they are useful for “traffic analysis” that enables better capacity planning.
The same devices obviously are available for use, and are being deployed by third parties that do not
need, and in any case do not ask for the users’ consent. According to a recent reports, the government
of China has been able in effect to “fire-wall” the entire country, thereby controlling connections with
the rest of the Internet in addition to monitoring the content of internally generated traffic (The
Economist, August 11, 2001, pp.9-10, 18-20) What makes this feasible for an authoritarian
government and a business corporation alike is that there are a relatively small number of paths
connecting its domain to the rest of the network. Inserting firewalls and filters at those few passage
points for traffic is an effective and comparatively low cost means of imposing selective controls on
the messages that residents of the domain are able to exchange with the rest of the world; it equally
permits the insertion of clandestine traffic analysis and content monitoring by outside parties.
Corresponding key passage points exist in any domestic network, notably where individual users are
connected to their ISPs, and at the network access points (NAPs) where the ISPs backbone networks
interconnect. Consequently, where ownership of the sub-networks is in private hands, the ISPs are
likely to emerge as the vehicles through which even the least authoritarian governments would seek to
implement measures of technological monitoring and control in pursuit of public policies (Clark and
Blumenthal, 2000: p. 12).
Similarly, given the comparative efficacy of applying legal and regulatory pressures upon large IPS’s
to impose self-controls over the content they carry, and the continuing drift towards greater and
greater concentration in an increasingly trans-national industry, may make it possible for political
movements as well as sovereign states to induce the adoption of “voluntary” policies of control.15
Conceivably, such labeling policies in conjunction with ISP filtering also might come to be used by
governments to restrict, however imperfectly, the carriage of encrypted traffic between sites on the
network that were unable to produce certificates of identity accompanied by “authorisations” to
engage in exchanges of encrypted data.
(ii) “Enchancements” to meet the requirements of new services
The Internet’s TCP protocol, which provides capabilities for reassembling packet in proper order,
retransmitting lost packets, and confirming complete delivery, offer a “best effort” quality of service
(QOS). Although this has been successful in supporting a wide range of applications running over the
Internet, it can not make any guarantees for users as to when, or even whether, data will be delivered.
Because voice and video services are degraded by the transmission delays (latency) and delay
variations (jitter) that network services like e-mail and Web browsing can tolerate, video- and voice-
streaming techniques have been developed that provide a partial enhancement but making use of
buffers located on the Net – typically in proximity to the locales where demand for content is most
concentrated..
The latter, however, is not a solution that meets the requirements of real-time voice, music and video.
Basically there are two approaches to dealing with this problem (see, e.g., CBST, 2001: pp. 98ff). One
is to add sufficient bandwidth to keep the packet-queue lengths to the necessary minimum latency
levels and, by preventing packets from being dropped when buffers overflow, to suppress jitter as
well. The costs of raising the quality of a best effort service in this way for the entire volume of
Internet traffic would be astronomical. Attention therefore has been directed to an alternative
approach: developing QOS mechanisms that could selectively and less expensively set different
service qualities for different (self-identified) classes of traffic, and managing the load placed on the
queue so that buffers do not overflow.
Much ingenuity has been devoted to designing a variety of QOS mechanisms. Among those currently
under consideration, the least sophisticated, so-called Differentiated Services (“diff-serv” in the
specialist’s parlance) approach, which that would allow ISPs to provide a quality of service above the
default best effort service without permitting the user to have discretion over the particular sessions on
the network during which a particular class of service would apply. This will necessitate placing a
service class indicator on the packet headers, with the routers of the network being modified to read
this label to determine how the packets would be queued; access to any given service class would then
be enforced at the edge of the network, using filtering based on IP addresses. A considerably more
complex and flexible proposal is referred to as “virtual overlay networks” (VONs). This would call
for capabilities to be added to the routers within the network to enable the setting up of virtual
networks in which traffic within an individual session-flow would compete with other packets on the
same VON, but not with the traffic from other flows (CBST, 2001: pp. 102-103, provides further
details and references). There remain unresolved technical issues, with which network engineers
continue to wrestle, including how the properties of an the virtual overlay network are to be specified,
and how to dynamically administer resources on routers associated with overlay networks. It is
perhaps needless to remark that pursuit of such means of “virtually” providing the services of a
connection-oriented network most likely would result in a re-engineering of some portions within the
network’s core, thereby departing far from the Internet’s end-to-end design principles.
It is worth closing this brief review by noticing a rather different technical development, which
involves the Network Address Translation (NAT) boxes that already are appearing on the Internet,
and which have the potential to siginificantly and adversely affect the network’s end-to-end
performance properties (see Clark and Blumenthal, 2000:pp.11-12). The function of a NAT box is to
modify the IP addresses on the packets, and because doing so offers a means of dealing with
perceived shortages in Internet addresses, they are typically installed by managers of organisational
(intra-) networks, and by ISP’s who use them to create “virtual IP addresses” within their domains.
As well as also simplifying the management of address space, NATs can help mask the user’s identify
from other end-points, and they have some other collateral filtering capabilities that leads them often16
to be integrated with firewalls. But the deployment of NAT requires adjustments elsewhere, because
when the IP addresses of packets entering and leaving a region of the network are rewritten, the box
must notify the TCP level where the error checking functions work on the assumption that IP
addresses are carried unchanged across the Internet from source to destination. Moreover, some
higher level applications protocols also make use of the IP address, which implies that correct
operation of those applications will be preserved only if the NAT box understands the design of the
application in question. This is a clear departure from the design principle of the Internet, which
pushes intelligence of that sort out of the core of the network and confines it to the edges.
But, that is not quite the end of the matter, for, as Clark and Blumenthal (2000) point out, IP addresses
now have come to be used in many other ways on the Internet, which also are likely to be disturbed by
the operation of NAT boxes. The software site-licensing facilities, for example, have been designed to
use the (supposed) stability of the client’s IP address as the means of controling the latter’s access to
the server, and would therefore be likely to reject a user whose ISP, or corporate NAT box presented
an apparently different name. These ramifications of the introduction of NAT boxes strikingly
illustrate the way in which incremental technological modifications made in a decentralized network
facility for benign, but localized purposes, may yield unintended adverse repercussions that extend
throughout the system.
(iii) Enabling ISPs’ usage-pricing strategies -- from congestion control to rent
extraction
Among the early contributions to “the economics of the Internet” perhaps the best known were those
concerned with the sources of congestion, and how to deal with them (see, Mackie-Mason and Varian,
1992/1996, 1993/1995a, 1994/1995b). What economists typically brought to this discussion, perhaps
all too predictably, was an abstract understanding of the phenomenon of congestion as a negative
externality suffered by all users as a consequence of the lack of some effective mechanism restraining
individuals’ claims on the limited available capacity. Casual analogies were drawn with the
phenomena of “over-fishing” and “over-grazing” of common resources, and the spectre was thus
raised of the Internet becoming another case of a resource whose utility was seriously degraded by
“congestion” arising from the absence of (bandwidth) usage-sensitive pricing. The mantra that
subsequently has been imparted to novitiates in the field of “Internet Economics” carries the same
message, formulated in a less normative way (e.g., by McKnight and Bailey, 1997: p.12): “Flat rate
pricing does not provide an economic congestion control mechanism for bandwidth resource
allocation”.
Congestion occurs on the Internet whenever the combined traffic needing to be forwarded onto a
particular outgoing link exceeds the capacity of that link. The design of the transmission control
protocol (TCP) assigns to the sending nodes the responsibility for regulating the flow of packets on
the basis of cumulative acknowledgments from (adjacent) receiving nodes of the arrival of packets
sent to them. This adaptive control mechanism operates in response to “packet losses” that reach a
rate signalling the presence of congestion to the routers that share the link. Thus, when congestion
occurs, a packet may be delayed, sitting in an adjacent router’s queue awaiting dispatch, and so will
arrive later than some other packet from the same message that has not been subject to queuing. The
result is delay in the reassembly of all the packets that contain the message, the condition described as
“latency” in the language of telecommunications engineers. (When queue lengths vary, and some
queues fill up, packets will be dropped by the router and therefore need to be resent, causing
variations of the duration of delays and the condition known as “jitter”.) Congestion typically is a
transient phenomenon, however, lasting only for the interval during which the TCP mechanism adapts
to the available capacity by slowing the outgoing packet rate. It can reach drastic levels, however, if
the capacities of the nodes available to each router fall below the minimum transmission rate provided
by the control protocol.17
The mechanism of congestion control provided by TCP, therefore, is simply to push back on the
traffic source dynamically, in response to the detection of congestion inside the network, until it no
longer is able to accept the offered load. This simple algorithm is incapable of discriminating among
the initiators of the offered load, or among various types of applications that are generating traffic.
Hence it cannot serve to shape the behaviour of individual users on the Internet, or even that of classes
of users. Moreover, this congestion control algorithm is neither enforced on the Internet, nor is it even
part of the protocol architecture of some applications that do not implement TCP – such as streaming
video and UDP (User Data Protocol). (See CSTB, 1994, p. 189, 201 n. 40.) Those applications
consequently can be viewed as taking “unfair advantage” of other applications, such as email that do
implement TCP.
Most of the proposals put forward by economists to correct this deficiency have favoured usage-
pricing, although their schemes have varied considerably both in the degree of their economic
sophistication and their complexity (useful reviews are provided by Cave and Mason, 2001; Gupte,
2001). At the upper end of that scale, the “smart market” mechanism advocated in the pioneering
work of Mackie-Mason and Varian (1993/1995a) applies the principles of a “Vickery auction”: users
would enter bids for network access that indicated a maximum willingness to pay, and routers would
recognise the bids attached to each of the data-packets; all packets with bids exceeding some cutoff
value would be admitted for forwarding. Given a fixed supply of bandwidth, the cutoff value would
therefore be the lowest bid that corresponded to the transmission capacity of the system, and that price
would be charged to all users whose bids were accepted. Consistent with marginal cost pricing
principles, when there were no bids for network access that fell below the router’s cutoff value, the
price would fall to zero.
As the authors of this proposal soon acknowledged (Mackie-Mason and Varian, 1994/1995b): “usage-
based pricing is itself expensive – it requires an infrastructure to track usage, prepare bills, and collect
revenues”. A subsequent publication (Mackie-Mason and Varian, 1997) took the matter further by
recognising that designing a congestion accounting and billing mechanism for a packet network is not
so straightforward a proposition; who should be charged, the sender of packets, or the receiver?
Consider the situation in which a user downloads a file from a public archive: both the applications
that are “parties to” the communication-transaction originate their own packets, but there is no way
for the routers to identify the many packets forwarded from the archive as being responses to the
session initiated by the small number of packets carrying the user’s request for the file. If such
requests resulted in congestion, how could the behaviour of the users be modified by charging the
costs to the passive party in the transaction (the archive)? To allocate the congestion costs between the
parties, the public archive in this case would have to have installed a billing mechanism, permitting
the subsequent reassignment of the charges to the user that had instigated the file transfer.
Just what changes would be required in the architecture and transmission control algorithms to enable
the routers to do all this was not considered. But, the design of the Internet’s transmission control
protocols (TCP) does not allow monitoring the state of congestion everywhere in the network, and so
the implementation of the suggested pricing mechanism, like that of quality of service (QOS)
schemes, would require monitoring and information collection functions that are not supported and –
with the continuing growth of the network – would become increasingly taxing for the simple routers
to accomplish in real time. Moreover, the cost allocation and billing requirements for congestion
control via QOS systems would call for the collection, transmission and processing of internal traffic
information, and as well as user bids, and the provision of discretionary network routing capabilities.
To imagine all that being implemented without substantial engineering departures from the principles
of an “end-to-end” architecture is hard indeed (see Odlyzko, 1998: pp. 26-27; CSTB, 2001: pp. 99-
100), and so it seems rather remarkable that the larger implications of such changes have not been
more prominent matters of concern for the proponents of such schemes.
More remarkable still is the continuing robustness of the economics literature’s fixation on
congestion-pricing, the pertinent facts notwithstanding. Congestion was not a major problem on the
Internet during the early 1990s, when its opening to commercial traffic first directed attention to the18
problem posed by the impending need to introduce usage-pricing; nor has the forecast condition of
chronic congestion materialised subsequently. Delays experienced on the Internet will indeed be
caused by queues, which are an intrinsic part of congestion control and the sharing of capacity (see
CSTB, 2001, pp. 98 ff.). But there can be other sources of delay. Indeed, because ISPs are not
required either to collect or release data on transmission delays, dropped packet rates, or other
network performance variables, there continues to be much disagreement over the exact extent to
which many of the service problems experienced by Internet users are properly attributable to
congestion, rather than other causes. The frequently observed delays in the delivery of email, for
example, are thought to be almost always the result of mail server faults that result in a large
proportion of the load being generated by the re-transmission of packets; and the painful slowness that
web-surfers encounter during peak hours is ascribed to non-responding web-servers (see Odlyzko
1998; also, Huitema 1997, as cited by Cave and Mason 2001).
Today congestion generally is understood to be rare within the backbone networks of North American
ISPs. The obvious explanation for the failure of chronic, paralysing congestion to materialise under
the conditions of “unpriced usage” lies in the rapid expansion of capacity to accommodate the growth
of Internet hosts and traffic; and because most of the widely used applications tolerated the congestion
control mechanisms provided by TCP. Whether bandwidth increases can continue to keep pace with
the growth of demand, of course, depends upon on whether QOS-enabling enhancements are made in
the network that will greatly increase the offering of bandwidth-hungry services, and the degree to
which competition will either check the ability of ISPs to differentially price such services in a
manner that curtails their needs for heavy investment in capacity, or result in rivalries among the
larger ISPs to stake out more “real estate” on the Net to attract an expanded customer base.
Instead of appearing ubiquitously throughout the rest of the network, however, congestion does
appear to be concentrated at particular “bottlenecks” created by disparities in the provision of
capacity. As has been noticed above, the links (exchange points) between ISPs – and especially the
public NAPs – are as a rule much more heavily congested than the links within the service providers’
respective networks (See, e.g., Odlyzko 1998, CSTB 2001: pp. 99, 117.). Although the links between
customers’ local area networks (LANs) or residences and their ISPs are also frequently congested, the
difficulty arises from the organisational delays or the expense entailed in increasing the capacity of
the connection. Persistent congestion has been documented at several international links, where long
and variable queuing delays, as well as high packet loss rates, have been measured. (See Paxson,
1999, and the discussion in CSTB 2001: pp.99-100.) Here again, however, the proximate source of
the problem appears to be rooted in institutional circumstances affecting the provision and allocation
of capacity at strategic connection points, rather than the endemic condition of unrestrained
bandwidth usage envisaged by economic theorising.
A cynical commentator might conclude that the stream of ingenious proposals from economists to fix
the problem of congestion on the Internet, in typically ignoring the possible strategic explanations for
congestion at the public NAPs, and proposing the introduction into the network’s core of the
intelligence needed to operate a sophisticated pricing mechanism, come down to the expedient of
making the network less and less like the Internet, and more closely akin to a connection-oriented
conventional PSTN. Quite obviously, however, had such a design been embraced to begin with, many
other difficulties posed by the peculiar open-architecture would have been obviated as well. Along
with removal of the obstacles to a mass transfer fee-for-service business models, this would reduce
the myriad practical difficulties that local communities linked to the Internet now encounter in
seeking to control the content of messages bearing “objectionable content.” In a connection-oriented
system it is much more feasible to rapidly and accurately identify the locations, if not the identities of
agents engaging in the electronic transmission of content which recipients deem to be pernicious --
and to set about mobilising political, social and legal counter-measures. There would, therefore, be
less need than presently exits to devote resources to the development of the still rather coarse-grain
“geo-locator technologies” that now are being use to create targets for “direct mail” advertising and
sales techniques based upon the characteristics of the receipients’ neighorhood; or to figure out
whether such technologies can be made sufficiently reliable to be employed to control the distribution19
of objectional content on the Internet, in the ways that would parallel the familiar content-regulating
actions of political authorities who can identify the originating parties and have legal juridication over
geographical territories in which they are situated.
Whether or not the removal of anonymity, and the re-imposition of greater controls on individuals’
access to content are desirable in some circumstances, is quite another matter (see Engel and Keller,
2000). The point is simply that the congestion-pricing solution envisaged for the Internet is not the
narrow matter of economic efficiency that economists have appeared to be presenting; its
implementation would require an architectural revolution in which the Internet as we know it would
have disappeared. Correspondingly, in that “brave new world,” debates about the conflicting
desiderata of privacy, anonymity and security would continue, but they would cease to be policy
matters that had a peculiar “Internet” aspect and would simply reprise the issues that society has
found ways of resolving for other communications media --- physical newspapers and books, plain
old telephones, radio, movies, and TV (see de Sola Pool, 1990).
Will the commercial pressures to insert new capabilities into the core of the network really have the
deleterious effects envisaged, and if undesireable consquences materialised, would it not be possible
to restore the status quo ante? Yet, the likelihood is that even the unintended ending of an integral
“end-to-end” Internet would not be readily reversible, and that the benefits thereby lost might prove
difficult if not virtually impossible to recover on a later, improved successor to the global information
infrastructure.
This last point deserves further elaboration, which can conveniently be provided by returning to
consider the concrete issue of permitting cable companies in the ISP market first to create proprietary
sub-networks on which QOS technologies are used to offer differentiated service choices to
subscribers. Users of a particular service, however, would have access only to the music and the video
that their ISP had designated, possibly also to a designated IP voice telephony service, and might be
similarly “locked in” to a particular suite of other Web-based services and applications software. Once
that structure was in place, however, the ISP in question might well be receptive to allowing
compatibility between this sub-network and other, similar sub-networks. The economic logic of this
situation differs from that which governs in the general analysis of compatibility standardisation for
network interoperability – where it is generally found that small networks seek connectivity with
larger ones, and the latter have stronger incentives to remain aloof from rivals of comparable size.
(See David and Greenstein, 1990, on the research literature; Shapiro and Varian, 1999: esp., chs. 7, 9
on strategies in “standards wars”.) By linking with similarly sized networks, an ISP with a large
network base could offer subscribers other enhanced services that are latency-sensitive, such as voice
telephony, and a larger choice among the set of pre-selected applications. The value of integrating to
achieve compatibility with smaller ISPs would remain comparatively small, and so, in this market
setting, the dynamics lead towards a high degree of market power concentrated in the hands of a small
number of ISPs, and a large fringe of ISPs whose clientele remains cut off from these enhanced
services.
Thus entrenched, the dominant ISPs would be in a position to extract some if not most of the rent that
might otherwise flow to the developers of applications innovations, in exchange for making these
available for use by their clientele. Lacking that access, the developers would be confined to
exploiting niche markets at the fringes of the network, where their products would remain beyond the
reach of the subscribers to the large ISPs. Nothing in this picture suggests that the emergent structure
of a partitioned network would be likely to be voluntarily dismantled by the incumbent, vertically
integrated ISPs, nor successfully attacked by an entrant possessing a novel and superior application
technology. An entrant with the capital resources required to establish a new, competitive vertically
integrated ISP, moreover, would have every incentive to seek compatibility with an existing large
service provider and, were the newcomer aggressive might expand by stealing the original
incumbent’s clientele. But, in addition to requiring the financial backing to create the additional
network capacity required for the implementation of that strategy, the successful entrant would
replicate the initial situation, and pose an even greater entry barrier to the next innovator.20
A mitigating consideration to be noted in the foregoing connection is that although the foregoing
technological “enhancements” of the Internet would create new opportunities for ISPs to extract
greater “rents” (consumer surplus) from their customers by means of discriminatory pricing schemes,
the strategy of vertical bundling of networking services and Internet-based applications nevertheless
would provide additional benefits for a large segment of the Internet population. The technologists
who created an end-to-end architecture, and who value it especially for the support it provided to
applications innovators, are less burdened than the typical Internet user by having to install, configure,
upgrade and maintain the software of each and every one of the rapidly growing number of
applications that must be attached at the networks’ end-points. This state of affairs can be expected
only to become more burdensome. As Clark and Blumenthal (2000: p.4) perceptively observe:
“The importance of ease of use will only grow with the changing nature of consumer
computing. The computing world today includes more than PCs. It has embedded
processors, portable user-interface devices such as computing appliances or personal
digital assistants (PDAs, such as Palm devices), Web-enabled television and
advanced set-top boxes, new kinds of cell-phones, and so on. If the consumer is
required to set up and configure separately each networked device he [sic!]owns,
what is the chance that at least one of them will be configured incorrectly. That risk
would be lower with delegation of configuration, protection, and control to a common
point, which can act as an agent for a pool of devices. This common point would
become a part of the application execution context….there would no longer be a
single indivisible end-point where the application runs.”
While pointing to the treat to the preservation of the open-network architecture, this acknowledges
that the creation by ISPs of enclaves containing advanced services would be one way in which the
multitude of less technically sophisticated users could obtain specialised (and correspondingly
standardised) network applications-integrating services. Thus, in regard to this issue as is the case in
so many others, network policy-makers face the classic “trade-off” of securing the immediate benefits
of standardisation by sacrificing the technological flexibility that is conducive to future radical
innovations (David 1995).
V. POLICY PRIORITIES AND PROTECTION OF THE INTERNET’S ARCHITECTURE
It has been seen that among the many technological “fixes” proposed for enhancing the Internet’s
performance, some are not so innocuous because they would entail inserting intelligence into the
“core of the network”. The likely impact of these induced innovations therefore would be the
alteration of the distinctive “end-to-end” architecture, pushing the future path of the network’s
evolution more towards emulating the performance features (both good and bad) associated with a
“connection-oriented” telecommunications system – the familiar paradigm of which exists in the
public switched telephone networks. (See David and Steinmueller, 1996 on this prospect.) Will the
changing balance among the interests of the communities using the information infrastructure,
inevitably, force a sacrifice of the global infrastructure’s transparency and openness, thereby raising
new barriers to the invention and diffusion of valuable applications? Inasmuch as a technological drift
away from the original Internet’s end-to-end architectural design should not be regarded as an
inexorable process lying beyond the reach of social control, there is scope for policy interventions to
check such a course of evolution. It must be hoped, then, that promoting wider understanding of the
issues that are at stake can increase the political feasibility of arriving at rational policy priorities. At
least, that is the spirit in which the following commentary on the identification and balancing among
confliciting “goods” will proceed. .
(i) QOS “enhancement” of the broadband Internet – a matter of benefits and costs21
A first appropriate step is to ask whether the net impact of any proposed movement in that direction
would be socially beneficial. In view of the prospective emergence of a broadband Internet on which
QOS will be more widely implemented by ISPs competing for customers while seeking the means to
charge what the (multimedia) traffic will bear, the question might be asked whether the time has come
for “end-to-end” to end. I could be argued that inasmuch as the days of “Internet1” as a unified global
infrastructure providing a receptive platform for rapid innovation and experimentation with networks
are numbered, the best course of action would be make whatever changes are required in the core of
the network to quickly reap the benefits of the available new services on a “users’ Internet.” That is to
say, we should come to terms with the outcome of the evolutionary dynamics driven by the needs of
the maturing market for a differentiated internet service, and think about other ways to provide a
network environment that would stimulate the continuation of “amazing innovations.”
Such a view would counsel turning attention to the construction of a separate, very high speed inter-
network as the test-bed and experimental commercial market for advanced services, which would be
designed to provide the features of openess and flexibility that have proved so encouraging to the
development of more powerful digital technologies. This might be called Internet2+ to distinguish it
from the actual federally funded backbone created to continue NSFNET’s research role. There is
something to be said for this vision of a cyclical regeneration of a new inter-networking environment
that would revive some characteristics of the original. It acknowledges the important symbiotic
relationship between the mature PSTN infrastructure upon which packet switching and the novel
technologies of the ARPANET and NSFNET could be erected; and it recognizes the fertility of
experimental research communities as sources of “user-designed” technological innovations. But,
unfortunately, it ignores the crucial fact that an important function aspect of the historical experience
cannot be replicated or revived by these means.
The nub of the problem is that to develop innovations that are readily available for deployment on the
Internet as it exists, one needs a test-bed with its technical features. Yet, for the communities that
would have access to Internet2+, and especially for those groups that are engaged in advancing the
frontiers of network engineering, the high value use would be to develop applications that utilised the
enhanced properties of that infrastructure rather than the more limited capabilities of Internet1 -- or
the still less accommodating infrastructure into which the latter would be tending to evolve. To make
this observation more concrete, it may be noted that in May 2000 Ipv6 was implemented on the actual
high-speed Internet backbone network known as Internet2 (see Zakon, 2001). Since the 128-bit
address code specified by the IP6 protocol vastly increases the number of available domain addresses,
permitting the assignment of unique addresses to individual microprocessor controlled devices that
can be reached by any telecommunication channel, much of the theoretical and practical engineering
challenge will be to develop ways of controlling such devices, and integrating their functioning into
larger and more complex systems. Protocols for the remote management of household appliances such
as coffee-pots and electric toasters, will soon be multiplying among the RFCs emanating from the
Internet Society (formerly the IETF, see, e.g., RFC 2324: “Hyper Text Coffee Pot Control Protocol
HTCPCP/1.0,” 1998). This and related trajectories of research and invention, however, will
necessarily become increasingly disconnected from operating conditions on the broadband network
that is already deployed -- unless the problems of governing Internet1 can be successfully resolved.
Yet, at present nobody knows how or whether it would be possible to stop that from happening by
“migrating” the mass of Internet users from the IPv4 protocol that has become universally deployed,)
to IPv6 (CSTB 2001:pp.77-81). With the possible exception of the planned use of IPv6 by suppliers
of so-called “third generation” wireless devices that are being developed to succeed mobile telephone
systems, equipment vendors and service providers are not offering the new protocol – presumably
because few users presently appear to see sufficient advantage in the change to make the pain and cost
worthwhile for them. This is the usual “chicken-and-egg” problem that can cause coordination
failures in market-guided standardisation processes, which is well is well-recognised by the
economics literature on network externalities and interoperability standards (see, e.g., Farrell and
Saloner 1986, David and Greenstein 1990, Shapiro and Varian 1999). Unfortunately, in the present
situation of the Internet, there no longer is the alternative mechanism of a central, governing agency22
or authority with the power to compel a coordinated switch of the sort that occurred when Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA, formerly ARPA) mandated the transition from NCP
to TCP on 1
st January 1983, and again, when NSF’s “diktat” obliged users wishing to connection with
the NSFNET to install the TCP/IP protocol stack
(ii) Upgrading for Internet telephony – is this trip necessary?
Would the enhancements in the quality of differentiated services, and in the ability of service
providers to engage in price discrimination among the users of the Internet, compensate for whatever
losses might be entailed in terms of curtailed future scalability and a slowed pace of innovation in
applications? Several grounds for scepticism regarding the value of the gains seem worth keeping in
mind.
To begin with, the incremental social benefit of upgrading the Internet to carry real-time audio traffic
is not obviously overwhelming, given the existence of other technological means of providing a large
part of the world’s population with access to voice telephony (via cellular radio and satellite
transmission) at lower fixed costs than those entailed in laying copper wire or fibre-optic cabling. To
be sure, Internet telephony could be integrated into new, multi-media services. Yet, there is a
disjunction here between a strategy directed toward opening profit opportunities in the developed
economies -- to elicit continued private sector investment in augmenting the broadband infrastructure
available to users in those countries -- and a policy that also takes account of the situation in the world
at large.
While cell-phone technology has opened the benefits of rapid, global communications to large cohorts
in the developing economies, it remains unsuitable for sparsely populated regions and geographically
remote sites, just as it is not capable of supporting the very high bandwidth communications that are
likely eventually to be in demand there. But systems of low earth orbit satellites (LEOS), which are
designed to provide two-way, low-latency, point-to-point transmissions, will be available to fill these
significant service gaps. According to expert engineering opinion, the seamless linking of LEO
satellite constellations into the world-wide communications infrastructure is a development that can
be expected to take place in the relatively near future. (Private communication from Robert Spinrad, 9
May 2000.)
For the developing economies, however, it is accepted that even to provide substantial narrowband
coverage, considerable amounts of public funding for upgrading existing telecommunications
infrastructures would be necessary; and some of that is likely to be provided by subsidised loans and
transfers through multinational cooperative agencies. It must therefore be recognised that the social
rate of return on public (and private) investments in this infrastructure would be reduced substantially
if the present core of the Internet were to be modified by engineering changes that deviated from the
principles of “end-to-end”. To permit alterations of the architecture of the backbone networks in the
high income countries, in order to provide users there with Internet voice telephony (along with
business or entertainment services integrating real-time video), would effectively mean curtailing the
access afforded newly connected users in the world’s poorer societies to existing information tools
and global data resources.
Thirdly, the claim that (with further upgrading of the technology to permit differential pricing of
services) it would be possible to eschew the regulation of business activities on the Internet seems an
illusory hope in the case of the high-income economies. The drive towards introducing QOS to enable
new services such as real-time video and audio – even if voice telephony via the Internet were not
considered a sufficiently compelling goal – has the already noticed potential to result in vertical
bundling of applications and other services by ISPs. A consequent reinforcement of existing trends
towards greater consolidation and concentration in that market, would most likely issue in
government interventions to preserve competition in Internet services that presently remain23
unregulated. Such pressures already exist for legislation or executive action to end the asymmetry
between US policy towards voice telephony on the (long-regulated) PSTN, and (currently
unregulated) Internet telephony. (See CSTB 2001: pp. 27, 170-175, for concerns that the regulatory
framework for the PSTN might thus be imposed, inappropriately upon the Internet’s very different
technology and industry organisation.)
(iii) Monitoring and filtering content on the Internet
Turning then to the sources of pressure to address the problematic technical aspects of the Internet, it
has been noted that the incremental value of the contemplated “technology fixes” may turn out to be
considerably smaller than might now appear to be the case. This is especially so in regard to dealing
with the problems created by “socially or culturally objectionable content” or “communications for
legally or politically unacceptable purposes.” The reason is simply that when it comes to discerning
the likely nature of contact by inferences based upon traffic analysis, or use of “geo-locators” inserted
at key points in the network, each advance in technique to date seems to have elicited corresponding
advance in the counter-measures. (see, e.g., CBST 1999b; Spinrad, private communication). For
example, a simple strategy now available for users to achieve anonymity and protect their
communications from observation by third parties -- whether private or governmental -- is to route
traffic through their own third parties, and thereby remove identification in the messages. Moreover,
various services have become available to prevent traffic analysis, and there now are more
sophisticated anonymous mail relay techniques, such as the “nym server” which allows users to
construct a route for messages on which the routing details are hidden by encryption from the ISP,
and other third parties (Clark and Blumenthal, 2000).
The foregoing remarks address possible discrepancies between the private incentives driving the
Internet’s technological evolution, and the social value of the enhancements that would thus be
achieved. They have not touched on the need to explore engineering improvements that can be
implemented (at the edges of the network) in ways that would not compromise performance attributes
that derived from the Internet’s end-to-end architecture. An example of the latter, content labeling
conventions, whose use of which might either be voluntary or enforced upon some content providers,
would enhance the efficiency of filtering at the end-points of the network.
But an another important set of alternatives to introducing control mechanisms in the network’s core,
which remains to be consider is the large class of non-technological options. In view of the fact that
the origins of many of the vexing dysfunctionalities of the Internet derive from the historical
displacement of the technology system from the peculiar, highly regulated behavioural and
organisational contexts within which it was created and initially used, an obvious option to be
considered is the restoration of some of the former modes of regulating users’ behaviours. The
Internet may have been a technology that quite by accident was well-attuned to the laissez-faire spirit
of the era in which it was publicly introduced. Yet, an ideologically driven commitment to go on
thinking exclusively in the same vein about ways to overcome the problems posed by the “network of
networks”, rejecting “social engineering” in favour of solutions found through “Internet re-
engineering”, is most likely to sacrifice the Internet’s unique and valuable pro-innovation features.
There is no a priori reason to conclude that the most efficient solution path is one that relies solely
upon “fixes” that can be technologically implemented. Proposed regulation and interventions by
public authorities continue to be opposed on the argument that such actions are inimical to the
Internet’s survival as a global interaction space free from governmentally imposed structures of social
regulation.
Current rhetorical support for relying upon engineers to fix whatever might really need mending,
rather than letting legislators and lawyers loose in cyberspace, presents a curious mixture of attitudes.
These are compounded from the libertarian philosophy that is pervasive among survivors of the
Internet’s pioneering user-groups, strains of anarcho-syndicalism that have emerged in the ethos of
the latter-day “hacker culture”, and the generic laissez-faire disposition of the Internet’s more recently
arrived community of business entrepreneurs. The holders of pro-commercial and anti-commercial24
sentiment alike appear quite comfortable making common cause against the “intrusion of government
regulations” that are socially engineered. This, it should be recognised, presents an essential political
and philosophical position, quite distinct from the utilitarian rationale that would give priority to
preserving the distinctive end-to-end architecture of the Internet – especially inasmuch as serving the
latter priority might call the development of new, institutional mechanisms of governance.
Lawyers looking at the evolving Internet are naturally disposed to pose this issue in terms of a
political choice between the regulation of human actions by laws or governance by “Code”–t h e
encompassing term used by Lessig (1999) in referring to the architectural configuration of networks
and the location of access points, the design of hardware, operating systems, languages, data formats
and applications software. Economists, it would seem, would have something helpful to contribute to
debates on these questions, by directing attention to the relative costs of alternative modes of
regulation in network environments, especially in view of the significant externalities and
irreversibilities that are likely to be entailed by introducing either technological or institutional
modifications in the existing regime. Furthermore, approach some questions that involve the
governance of human behaviour in cyberspace from the perspective of the “economics of crime and
punishment” may also be a useful way to mediate in debates between the engineers and the lawyers:
the quest for perfect technological mechanisms of detection and suppression of malefactors is only
relevant in a perfect world, and it is possible to compensate for reduced probabilities of being caught
by raising the penalties visited upon those who are. This approach may not be good enough in some
areas of concern, and other technological safeguards will be needed to protect humans and vital
technological systems alike from grave damage. But much of the law afforded under the law has been
found to work tolerably well with this “mixed” approach.
For those reasons and still others, the relevant policy questions ought not to be construed in terms of
making “either or choices.” It is important to resist the rhetoric of much contemporary discussion of
economic policy, which tends to offer only extreme alternatives. Participants are too often driven into
opposing camps, one side calling for the introduction of government controls, and the other placing its
faith upon the further development of decentralised, automatic, supposedly neutral and (“market-
like”) regulatory mechanisms that can better resist political manipulation and so preserve greater
scope for human volition. The following statement exemplifies the polarising impact of applying the
“technologists’ Internet philosophy” to decide upon the best means of protecting privacy on the Net:
“[t]he cyperpunk credo can be roughly paraphrased as ‘privacy through technology,
not through legislation.’ If we can guarantee privacy protection through the laws of
mathematics rather than the laws of men and whims of bureaucrats, then we will have
made an important contribution to society. It is this vision which guides and
motivates our approach to Internet privacy.” (Goldberg et al., 1997, quoted in Clark
and Blumenthal, 2000, p.28, n.52.)
A full-blown systems design approach, by contrast, would hold that if the benefits of the Internet’s
end-to-end architecture are to be retained, some technological solutions simply cannot be substituted
for other, socio-legal modes of governing the behaviour of agents on the Internet. Rather than being
viewed as antithetical substitutes, the potential complementary of technological and institutional
mechanisms governing the digital communications infrastructure need to be explored in a coordinated
manner.
There is thus a case to be made for devoting greater attention to matching the technological
innovations of the Internet by mobilising other, non-technologically implemented modes of
regulation. Greater consideration surely is worth directing to the design of legal, political and social
rule structures and administrative procedures, of the kind that proved to be efficacious in supporting
successful economic exploitation of previous technical advances in communications networks. In this
connection it is worth recalling that the oldest international treaty organisation in existence today is
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This institution, which began its life in 1865 as
the International Telegraph Union, provided the model in whose image virtually all subsequent25
international treaty-based organisations were created (see David and Schurmer 1996; Schmidt and
Werle, 1998). While that may suffice to suggest the possibility that fruitful innovations in
international rule-making fora can be driven by the opportunities, or problems, that new technologies
create, there is no doubt that today very formidable challenges are posed for the adaptive co-evolution
of international laws governing cyberspace (see, e.g., Gamble, 1999.)
Globalisation and global information networks call for the internationalisation of rule-making, both in
terms of de-regulation and re-regulation. This applies to issues of network access as well as the
regulation of content (see, e.g., Grewlich, 1999). Traditional civil and criminal law notions of legal
liability for the provision of harmful content are challenged by the provision of information and
entertainment over global networks; presently there is no international agreement as to which of the
actors on the multimedia chain (network operator, ISP, content packager, or content producer) should
be held liable for content deemed “harmful” or injurious, by local or national community standards.
Nor is the notion of common international criteria for the setting admissible “local standards” at all
well defined. A similarly difficult challenge pertains in regard to issues of jurisdiction – i.e.,
determining which state should have the legal right to intervene in the operations of networks over
which content is being disseminated globally.
National governments belonging to the EU lately are being forced by such questions to review public
law traditions, and to seek innovative forms of regulatory cooperation. The existence of new common
European legal and regulatory standards, and the concerns of national entities for cross-border effects
arising within the unified EU market from persisting national differences in administrative and legal
regulations, obviously, are powerful forces impelling these harmonisation efforts. But, whether the
development of regional agreements on trade liberalisation covering other parts of the world would
alone be sufficient to provide greater impetus for cooperative approaches in forming new international
governance mechanisms, remains far from clear. It certainly constitutes a question deserving further
examination. (See the forthcoming CSTB Committee Report on Global Networks and Local Values,
esp., chs.5, 9.)
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE POLICY-RELEVANT “INTERNET ECONOMICS”
Even as the Internet “comes of age”, the technology of the global information infrastructure and the
organisation of the communication service industries based upon it continue to undergo significant
changes. The main message carried by the foregoing discussion is that many engineering proposals
and policy recommendations that have been presented as incremental modifications to enhance the
performance capabilities of the Internet actually may have radical implications for the future course of
its technological evolution. These have been seen to involve rather esoteric matters that might appear
best left to be decided by engineering specialists, and experts in the intricacies of telecommunications
regulations. But decisions taken in those realms will powerfully shape the future performance
characteristics of the Internet. In that way, they will have important consequences for the nature, size
and distribution of the economic and social benefits that it yields.
Bertrand Russell once remarked that we must “tolerate specialists because they do good work”.
Perhaps it would be more generous to speak of “appreciation” rather than toleration, but the point
remains that in matters whose potential implications for human welfare are as important as those at
hand, more than narrow expertise is wanted. The story of the Internet’s development justly can be
presented as a remarkable case of “success by design” (CSTB 2001, p. 34 invokes this phase in
discussing architectural principles). Equally, it may be read as a path-dependent tale of fortuitous
engineering design decisions that were made with little consideration for aspects that have turned out
to be problematic for many of the purposes, and social contexts in which the resultant, wonderfully
open and flexible technology would be used. (On concepts of irreversibility, path-dependence and
“path-constrained melioration”, see David 2001.) As societies around the world continue to wrestle
with difficult technical challenges and policy quandaries that have their origins in historically remote26
decisions that proved to be essentially irreversible, an obvious question to be asked is whether it has
become possible now to proceed differently.
That is to say, is it possible to arrive at policy commitments affecting the future technological
evolution of the Internet (and its successor networks) that are any more fully informed and forward-
looking than those of the past, or do we need to press forward as before and trust largely to a mixture
of good luck and future ingenuity in coping with the outcome? The response here has been to try to
move in the former direction, however modestly. Thus, the discussion has sought to identify both the
range of often conflicting concerns, and the array of often mutually compatible policy instruments,
that need to be kept in view during what should be inter-connected processes of debate and decision-
making in the areas of telecommunications engineering, institutional design, and the development and
application of judicial and administrative law.
The central policy issue can be structured roughly in the following terms. The end-to-end architectural
design of the Internet can be regarded as “a public good” that facilitates certain (publicly enjoyed)
benefits, e.g., scalability, extension of connectivity at low incremental costs, ease of development and
wide deployment of new applications – which stimulates innovation and the benefits that users derive
therefrom. Therefore, there are conflicts with other “public goods,” such as trustworthiness of
communications (security, privacy), protection from terrorist actions coordinated through the Internet,
ease of “setup” for the mass of users. In addition there are conflicts with “private goods,” such as
freedom from spam” and offensive content, that can be obtained at lower private expense by
technological “fixes” that would be introduced into the core of the network.
Three broad guidelines then emerge for the formulation of regulatory approaches. First, where the
conflict is with “private goods,” the principle of protecting the end-to-end architecture generally
should dominate, even if confining the implementation of technical fixes to the edges of the network
are less efficient from an engineering perspective and impose higher private costs upon users. Second,
where the provision of the “private good” only is feasible by altering the open, transparent character
of the network core, arguments for adhering to the “end-to-end design principle” have no real force:
the trade-off becomes not one of “how” but of “whether” to do it. The loss of the “public goods”
benefits should then be weighed against the private gains of the new functionality that the engineering
changes would provide for users. Third, some still more difficult situations must be acknowledged in
which there will be conflicts among different forms of “public goods” on the Internet. Consideration
of the distributional issues this is likely to raise is unavoidable, so that the questions for policy-making
are inherently political; to opt simply to implement the technological modifications that can be
implemented as least direct cost would not only ignore this, but generally will fail to guarantee a
solution that was optimal even when viewed from the narrow perspective of economic efficiency.
This set of “guidelines” is not incongruent with the positions recently articulated in Clark and
Blumenthal’s (2000) reconsideration of how “end-to-end principles” should be applied in policy
debates concerned with regulation of the Internet.
The “historical economics” approach (David, 2001) that informs much of the foregoing discussion
carries some additional, and potentially more provocative suggestions for rethinking the economics of
the telecommunications regulation in the age of the Internet. Because economic analysis of industrial
organisation and public regulation of telecommunications utilities was developed with reference to
industries based upon a mature network technology, practitioners in this area remain too inclined to
start from the assumption that “the technology is given”. This is seldom true, and it is palpably
misleading when applied to the situation of the Internet. The first lesson, then, is to think in terms of
the way in which the structure of the existing markets, and the uneven and uncoordinated regime of
regulation and non-regulation, induces research and technological innovation to take some directions,
while discouraging it from proceeding in others.
There are two additional, corollary suggestions for economists who rightly think they should have
something to contribute to solving problems in the allocation of resources on the Internet. First, from
the view of the technological configuration of the Internet as an endogenous, rapidly co-evolving state27
variable there follows the simple principle that economists should start by understanding the features
that already are distinctive but subject to transformation. For quite understandable reasons, such as the
lower average cost of prescribing remedies for problems you have treated many times before,
excessive attention has been devoted to the topic of network congestion and pricing remedies to
control it. Indeed, this emerged as the paradigmatic subject matter of mainline “Internet Economics”.
It has taken some while for the designers of sophisticated usage-pricing mechanisms (and some QOS
implementations) to come to a realisation that implementation of their proposals would require
substantial re-engineering inside the network, modifications that apart from their immediate cost
would in effect sacrifice the benefits deriving from the end-to-end principles of Internet architecture.
This, of course, is not the only instance of a misdirected economic policy recommendation, and it will
certainly not be the last. Its significance here is to be found in the fact that it stems from the more
general practice of casually transferring to the sphere of “internet economics” analyses and policy
prescription that had been developed in the context of mature telecommunications networks (i.e., the
PSTN). Similarly, a good bit of prominence has been given to the discussion of principles that should
govern optimal pricing of access to the transport/bearer layer of the Internet, a matter of undoubted
importance for existing and would-be service providers. In a technologically dynamic network setting
such as that of the Internet, however, the feasibility and terms of entry also depend on “non-price”
policies, including those affecting technical compatibility standards, and regulations governing the
interconnection strategies of incumbent service providers (see Cave and Mason, 2001). Over the
long-run, the “technical rules of the game” affecting physical interconnection are likely to be more
consequential than pricing formulae in their effects upon the growth and distribution of available
bandwidth, competition in the ISP market, and the rate of innovation in applications on the Internet.
In the current, fluid state of the technology, it seems imperative for economists to work more closely
with members of other disciplines in assessing the societal implications of specific proposals to
modify the technology and governance institutions of the Internet. A foreseeable and highly desirable
outcome of embarking upon such a program would be the transformation of “Internet economics” into
a more policy-relevant area of inquiry; a sub-discipline that was effectively defined by its recognition
of the distinctive technical constraints and potentialities of the existing technology, as well as by the
regulatory issues posed for the Internet industry by its co-existence with industries and institutions
that originally were formed on the basis of quite different communication facilities. Members of other
well-established disciplines – principally, specialists belonging to the telecommunications engineering
community, and lawyers versed in regulation and international law – who would be drawn into this
process may be just as discomforted as economists in having to yield some sovereignty in their
accustomed domains of expertise. Nevertheless, the price to society of indulging each among the
needed assembly of research communities in the comforts of professional autarchy now seems too
high to continue to be easily borne.28
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